Influence maximization is a key problem in social networks, seeking to find users who will diffuse information to influence a large number of users. A drawback of the standard influence maximization is that it is unethical to influence users many of whom would be harmed, due to their demographics, health conditions, or socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., predominantly overweight people influenced to buy junk food). Motivated by this drawback and by the fact that some of these vulnerable users will be influenced inadvertently, we introduce the problem of finding a set of users (seeds) that limits the influence to vulnerable users while maximizing the influence to the non-vulnerable users. We define a measure that captures the quality of a set of seeds, as an additively smoothed ratio between the expected number of influenced non-vulnerable users and the expected number of influenced vulnerable users. Then, we develop greedy heuristics and an approximation algorithm called ISS for our problem, which aim to find a set of seeds that maximizes the measure. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets and demonstrate that ISS substantially outperforms a heuristic competitor in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency while being more effective and/or efficient than the greedy heuristics.
Introduction
There has been an increased interest from the public and private sectors and organizations in leveraging social networks to spread information of adopting certain behavior (e.g., buying ipads or alcoholic beverages). A typical methodology of an organization is to influence a selected few users (seeds), through free gifts, discounts, and information sessions, to adopt the desirable behavior. The hope is that these seeds will influence other users in their social circles to adopt the same behavior, and the subsequent influenced users will influence others in their respective social circles. As the information propagates throughout the social network, eventually some number of users will adopt the desirable behavior.
As a result, the organization's goal is to solve the problem of selecting a set of k seeds which maximize the largest expected number of adoptions of all the users in the social network (spread). This problem is known as the influence maximization problem in social networks [10] and has been widely studied in the recent decade [14] . A main drawback of influence maximization is that it is unethical to influence users many of whom could be harmed due to their demographics, health conditions, or socioeconomic profile [7] . The users who could be harmed are referred to as vulnerable and are identified based on domain knowledge (e.g., user message content and sentiment analysis) [15, 21] . For example, when an organization aims to promote alcoholic beverages, it should avoid influencing users many of whom have drinking problems. Similarly, when it aims to promote junk food, it should avoid influencing users many of whom are overweight. This is important for performing socially responsible influence maximization [1], which benefits not only the vulnerable users but also the companies, because most users are often willing to pay more for products marketed in a socially responsible way [19] . Motivated by the presence of vulnerable users, we initiate the study of influence maximization in social networks with both vulnerable and non-vulnerable users. In particular, due to the diversity of social networks and that some vulnerable users will be influenced inadvertently, we consider the problem of limiting the influence to vulnerable users while maximizing the influence to the non-vulnerable users in social networks. Contribution. Our work makes the following specific contributions.
(1) Influence Measure. To deal with influence maximization in our setting, we need a measure to quantify the quality of a set S of seeds (seed-set). The measure should ideally consider both vulnerable and non-vulnerable users, limit influencing users many of whom are vulnerable, and allow obtaining a seed-set with guaranteed quality. We examine the following natural measures and show that they are inappropriate to be used for influence maximization in our setting: (a) the difference σ N (S) − σ V (S) and (b) the ratio σ N (S) σ V (S) , where S is a seed-set and σ N (S) and σ V (S) is the expected number of influenced non-vulnerable users and vulnerable users, respectively. Then, we propose an additive smoothing ratio (ASR) measure σ N (S)+c σ V (S)+c , where c > 0 is a specified constant. We show that ASR satisfies all the aforementioned properties and examine the impact of c in our influence maximization setting. Thus, our problem becomes finding a seed-set S of size at most k that maximizes ASR. This is a challenging problem because ASR is not monotone and neither submodular nor supermodular, which implies that it cannot be approximated through algorithms for submodular or supermodular maximization [4, 18, 23] .
(2) Baseline Heuristics for Finding an ASR-Maximizing Seed-set. Since ASR is a ratio of submodular functions, we develop a natural greedy heuristic (GR) that finds a seed-set of size at most k and large ASR iteratively. In each iteration, GR selects as seed a non-vulnerable node which influences a large number of additional non-vulnerable nodes for a small number of additional vulnerable nodes. We then develop GR M B , a variation of GR that estimates the spread efficiently.
(3) Approximation Algorithm for Finding an ASR-Maximizing Seed-set. We design ISS, an efficient approximation algorithm for finding a seed-set to maximize ASR. Since ASR is not submodular, ISS cannot maximize it directly. Instead, ISS constructs three candidate seed-sets (one with ASR, another with a submodular lower bound function of ASR, and a third with a submodular upper bound function of ASR) and selects the best candidate seed-set. This is performed iteratively, with different bound functions that aim to increase the ASR of the final seed-set. Our experiments show that ISS outperforms a heuristic that is based on the difference σ N (S) − σ V (S) [20] as well as GR and GR M B , with respect to ASR and the spread of non-vulnerable and/or vulnerable nodes, while it is efficient and also scalable with respect to the seed-set size k.
Background
Submodular functions. Let U be a universe of elements and 2 U be its power set. [12] . If the property holds with equality, then f is modular. A function f : 2 U → R is supermodular if and only if −f is submodular [12] . A modular function f : 2 U → R is both submodular and supermodular. For brevity, we may write f (X|u) for the marginal gain f (X ∪ {u}) − f (X).
Let f : 2 U → R be a submodular function. For any Y ⊆ U , the modular upper bound f Y (X) of f (X) is a modular function [9] 
Y is referred to as the parameter of the bound, π Y is a random permutation of the elements of Y (i.e., one-to-one mapping of Y onto itself), and
where π Y u − is the prefix of π Y comprised of all elements of π Y that appear before u in π Y , and π Y u is the prefix of π Y comprised of all elements of π Y u − and u. Independent Cascade (IC) model. To model influence, we consider the classical IC model [10, 20, 24] . The model views the social network as a weighted directed graph G(V, E), where V and E is the set of nodes and edges of G, respectively. In our setting, V is partitioned into N and V, comprised of all non-vulnerable and vulnerable nodes, respectively. We assume that N = ∅, otherwise no seed can be selected, and that V is selected by the organization performing influence maximiza-tion based on domain knowledge [15, 21] . The set of in-neighbors (respectively, out-neighbors) of a node u is denoted with n − (u) (respectively, n + (u)), and its size is referred to as the in-degree (respectively, out-degree) of u. In the IC model, each newly activated node u tries to activate each inactive out-neighbor u ∈ n + (u ) once with probability p((u , u)), which is modeled as a weight of the edge (u , u) in G and is typically set to 1 |n − (u)| [24] . If multiple nodes have the same out-neighbor, they all try to activate it in an arbitrary order independently. The diffusion process starts from a set S of nodes (seeds), which are active at time 0. Each seed tries to activate its out-neighbors at time 0, each activated out-neighbor stays active and tries to activate its own inactive out-neighbors at time 1, and the process proceeds similarly and ends when no new node becomes active. A seed-set S activates a node u with probability P S (u), and the spread of S over V , N , and V is defined as
u∈N P S (u), and σ V (S) = u∈V P S (u), respectively. For any seed-set S, σ N (S) and σ V (S) are monotone submodular functions [10] . We may omit the argument and value of σ N and σ V when it is clear from the context (e.g., write a seed-set with zero σ N instead of a seed-set S with σ N (S) = 0).
Measures and Problem Definition
To study influence maximization in our setting, we need a measure that quantifies the quality of a seed-set and can be incorporated into methods to construct a high quality seed-set. The measure should favor a seed-set S that influences many nonvulnerable but few vulnerable nodes and also satisfy the following properties:
1. It should consider the influence of vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes. In fact, we observed experimentally that constructing S based on only σ N (S) (resp., σ V (S)) results in large σ V (S) (resp., small σ N (S)), which is undesirable. 2. It should consider what fraction of all influenced users are vulnerable. This is important to penalize seed-sets that influence a large expected number of users many of whom are vulnerable. 3. It should allow constructing a seed-set with guaranteed quality (e.g., not "too far" from the optimal seed-set in the worst case) [10] .
Natural Measures. A first measure is the difference σ N (S) − σ V (S) given a seedset S (i.e., the measure used in [20] , with vulnerable nodes being treated as nontarget nodes). This measure does not consider what fraction of all influenced users are vulnerable. Therefore, it may lead to constructing seed-sets with a large expected number of influenced users many of whom are vulnerable. For example, this measure would favor promoting an alcoholic beverage to 140 users out of whom 40 have drinking problems, instead of 59 users with no drinking problems, since
cannot be approximately maximized [9] . Thus, to construct a seed-set S, one has to settle with heuristics, such as [20] , which offer no approximation guarantees. Another natural measure is the ratio σ N (S) σ V (S) . The ratio considers what fraction of all influenced users are vulnerable, because it can be rewritten as σ(S)−σ V (S)
σ V (S) − 1 and the constant can be removed when it is maximized. However, it is undefined for every seed-set S with σ V (S) = 0 (i.e., S that does not influence vulnerable nodes). Thus, it cannot distinguish between any two seed-sets S 1 , S 2 such that σ V (S 1 ) = σ V (S 2 ) = 0 and σ N (S 1 ) > σ N (S 2 ) (e.g., it cannot favor promoting an alcoholic beverage to 59 users with no drinking problems vs. 2 users with no drinking problems) and also it is not clear how it can be approximately maximized. For example, the GreedRatio framework [3] for maximizing a ratio of two monotone submodular functions would result in a seed-set of unbounded size, which is not useful for influence maximization. The inverse ratio σ V (S) σ N (S) is defined for σ V (S) = 0 but it cannot be used to distinguish between the seed-sets S 1 and S 2 above, and it is equally difficult to minimize (minimizing it is equivalent to maximizing σ N (S) σ V (S) ). Thus, it cannot be used to find a seed-set with small or zero σ V (S) and large σ N (S), which helps our goal (to attract many users few of whom are vulnerable). Our Proposed Measure. To retain the benefits of the ratio σ N (S) σ V (S) , while fixing the issues caused by seed-sets that do not influence any vulnerable nodes, we apply additive smoothing [16] to the ratio. This leads to our additive smoothing ratio (ASR) measure, defined as ASR(S, c) = σ N (S)+c σ V (S)+c , where S is a seed-set and c > 0 is a constant determined by the organization performing influence maximization. ASR is well defined (and larger than zero) when σ V (S) = 0. Furthermore, among the seedsets S 1 and S 2 mentioned above, it favors the seed-set S 1 , which influences a larger expected number of non-vulnerable nodes. In ASR, the constant c can be seen as a weight whose addition to σ N (S) and to σ V (S) changes their ratio and determines seed selection. The impact of c on seed selection will be discussed in Sections 4 and 6. Given our measure ASR, we define our influence maximization problem below.
and each edge probability is equal to 1. (b) The spread over non-vulnerable nodes, the spread over vulnerable nodes, and ASR for different seeds-sets with c = 1.
Problem Definition. Given a graph G whose nodes are partitioned into N and V and parameters k and c, find a seedset S ⊆ N of size at most k that maximizes ASR(S, c).
Our problem is NP-hard (by reduction from the standard influence maximization problem [10] ) and cannot be approximated using algorithms for submodular [4, 18] or supermodular [23] maximization. This is because ASR is non-monotone and is neither submodular nor supermodular, as we show below.
Example 1. Consider the graph of Fig. 1a , whose set of nodes is partitioned into N = {u 1 , . . . , u 4 } and V = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 }, and the ASR of the seed-sets in Fig. 1b .
Baselines: Greedy Heuristics for Maximizing ASR
We explore two greedy baseline methods for constructing a seed-set S with size at most k and large ASR(S, c). The first is, GR, a natural heuristic for limiting the influence to vulnerable nodes. GR performs k iterations. In each iteration i (steps 3 to 6), it adds into the subset S i the node u with the maximum ratio between: (I) the sum of the marginal gain in σ N , caused by adding u, and the constant c, and (II) the sum of the marginal gain in σ V , caused by adding u, and the constant c. Since ASR is non-monotone, a subset constructed in an iteration before i may have a larger ASR than S i . Therefore, in step 7, GR considers the subsets constructed in all iterations and returns the one with the largest ASR.
We now discuss how GR deals with a non-vulnerable node v that influences no vulnerable nodes. Adding v into S i makes the objective function of GR equal to σ N (Si|v)+c c (see step 4), since S i does not influence more vulnerable nodes after the addition of v (i.e., σ V (S i |v) = 0). If σ N (S i |v) is small, it is better to add a different node v which influences few vulnerable nodes but "through" these vulnerable nodes reaches out to many more non-vulnerable nodes than v. In fact,
, and uses the parameter c to control the bias towards nodes such as v , which influence a small number of vulnerable nodes but many more non-vulnerable nodes than u, as shown in Example 2 and experimentally in Section 6. Example 2. In iteration i = 0, the non-vulnerable nodes u 1 to u 4 in Table 1a are considered and the node u ∈ {u 1 , . . . , u 4 } with the largest σ N (S0|u)+c σ V (S0|u)+c is added into S 0 = {}. As shown in Table 1b , c determines the added node. For c = 0.01, u 1 that influences no vulnerable and few non-vulnerable nodes is added, for c = 1, u 3 that influences one vulnerable and many non-vulnerable nodes is added, and for c = 10, u 4 that influences more vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes than u 2 is added. To improve the efficiency of GR, we propose a variant, GR M B (MB is for MIA Batchupdate). Unlike GR which computes spread exactly by adapting the method of [8] to the IC model, GR M B estimates the spread efficiently using the MIA (Maximum Influence Arborescence) method [24] . MIA estimates the probability P S (u) for a node u and seed-set S based on the union of paths from S that have the highest probability to influence u, instead of all paths. Consequently, GR M B is two orders of magnitude faster on average than GR. 5 The ISS Approximation Algorithm for Maximizing ASR This section presents ISS (Iterative Subsample with Spread bounds), starting from the bound functions of ASR that ISS employs. Lower and upper bound function of ASR. ASR(S, c) is non-monotone nonsubmodular for any subset S (see Section 3) and, thus, it is difficult to approximate directly. Our ISS algorithm finds a seed-set S with approximately maximum ASR(S, c), using two submodular functions ASR L and ASR U that bound ASR from below and from above, respectively. These functions are defined as follows:
where Y ⊆ N is the parameter in each bound function, and
ASR L , as well as ASR U , is submodular with respect to a seed-set S, because: (a) Its numerator is monotone submodular, as a sum of the monotone submodular function σ N (S) and the constant c [12] , (b) its denominator is a modular function, as a sum of a modular bound function and the constant c, and (c) the ratio between a submodular function and a modular function is clearly submodular (see Section 2). However, ASR L , as well as ASR U , is non-monotone, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3. (continuing from Example 1) Let c = 1 and S = {}. Since ASR L (S 1 , 1, S ) = 4/4 > ASR L (S 1 ∪{u 1 }, 1, S ) = 5/6, ASR L is non-monotone. Let S = {u 2 , u 3 } and its permutation π S = (u 3 , u 2 ). Since ASR U (S 3 , 1, π S ) = 4/3 > ASR U (S 3 ∪{u 2 }, 1, π S ) = 5/4, ASR U is non-monotone.
ISS algorithm. The algorithm works iteratively, as can be seen from the pseudocode. In each iteration, it creates a seed-set S cur in three phases: (a) dummy element creation, (b) construction of three candidate seed-sets (one using ASR, a second using ASR L and a third using ASR U ), and (c) selection of the best candidate seed-set and removal of dummy elements from it. The iterations stop when S cur is not better than the previously created seed-set S pr in terms of ASR (steps [21] [22] . This guarantees that the algorithm terminates [9] . Add into R a random element from
Scur ← Remove all dummy elements from Scur k elements from N and a dummy element is created. Next, the candidate subset S O i , S U i and S L i is extended with a node in the sample causing the largest marginal gain with respect to ASR, ASR L , and ASR U , respectively. The parameter of ASR L is the seed-set S pr , constructed in the previous iteration and that of ASR U is a random permutation π Spr of S pr . Phase III (steps 19 to 23): The best candidate subset with respect to ASR is selected as S cur , and all dummy elements are removed from it. If S cur is not better than S pr in terms of ASR, the while loop in step 3 is terminated and S cur is returned. Otherwise, another iteration is performed with the aim of generating a seed-set with larger ASR, due to the use of different (and often better [9] ) bounds.
Theorem 1. ISS constructs a seed-set S such that:
where S * = arg max S⊆N ,|S|≤k ASR(S, c), σ V,Spr is the modular upper bound used in ASR L (step 14) in the last iteration of ISS, and the expectation is over every possible S constructed by ISS.
Proof. Let S L,j k (respectively, S prj ) denote the subset S L k (respectively, S pr ) in step 19 of an iteration j of ISS (j-th execution of the while loop in step 3). Since ASR L bounds ASR from below, we have ASR(S L,j k , c) ≥ ASR L (S L,j k , c, Spr j ). Also, from the monotonicity of expectation, this inequality can be written as
where each expectation is over every S L,j k . We now observe that
where S * ,j = arg max S⊆N ,|S|≤k ASR L (S, c, Spr j ). Eq. 5 holds because S L,j k is constructed based on the Sub-sample Greedy algorithm [17] with ASR L in each iteration (execution of the while loop in step 3) of ISS. Thus, we obtain:
) · ASR(S * ,j , c).
The first inequality holds from Eqs. 4 and 5, the second from the definition of ASR L and because we multiply by 1 (in square brackets), and the third by the definition of ASR. Since the third inequality holds for every iteration j of ISS:
where S L is the subset S L,j k constructed in step 19 of the last iteration of ISS. Let S U,j k (respectively, S prj ) denote the subset S U k (respectively, S pr ) in step 19 of an iteration j of ISS (j-th execution of the while loop in step 3). We first prove:
The first inequality holds because σ V,Spr j is submodular, the second because |S U,j k | ≤ k and σ V,Spr j is non-negative, and the third because S U,j k ⊆ N . From Eq. 7 and σ V (S U,j k ) ≤ σ V,Spr j (S U,j k ) (as σ V,Spr j bounds σ V from above), we get:
The second inequality is because σ
, which implies:
from Eq. 8, where the expectation is over each
is constant in iteration j, so
We now observe that
where S * ,j = arg max S⊆N ,|S|≤k ASR U (S, c, π Spr j ). Eq. 10 holds because S U,j k is constructed based on the Sub-sample Greedy algorithm [17] with ASR U in each iteration (execution of the while loop in step 3) of ISS. Thus, we obtain:
The first inequality holds from Eqs. 9 and 10, the second because the term in square brackets is at most 1 (since σ V,π Spr j bounds σ V from below), and the third from the definition of λ j and ASR. Since the third inequality holds for each iteration j of ISS, we obtain:
where S U is the subset S U,j k constructed in step 19 of the last iteration of ISS. The proof follows from Eqs. 6 and 11 and step 19 in ISS.
Although the guarantee in Theorem 1 holds irrespectively of the number of iterations of ISS, we observed, in our experiments, that more iterations result in seed-sets with larger ASR. This is because the parameter S pr and π Spr of the bound functions ASR L and ASR U , respectively, is updated in every iteration which often improves the bounds [9] . We also observed that ISS needed at most 4 iterations to terminate. ISS is faster than GR and scales better with respect to k, because it selects seeds from a sample of N of size approximately |N | k , instead of the entire set N , and because it performs a small number of iterations.
Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate GR, GR M B , and ISS, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, by comparing them against TIM [20] , a heuristic for finding a seed-set S with size at most k and large σ N (S) − σ V (S), and two baselines that employ Greedy [18] : RB, which applies Greedy [18] to the subset of non-vulnerable nodes that do not influence vulnerable nodes, and RB , which applies Greedy with the objective function σ N . RB creates a seed-set S with σ V (S) = 0 and was used to see whether S can have large σ N (S). RB creates a seed-set S with large σ N (S) and was used to see whether S can have small σ V (S). RB found seed-sets that influenced many more vulnerable nodes than those of all other methods, thus, we omit its results. All algorithms were implemented in C++ and applied to the Wiki-vote (WI), Twitter (TW), and PolBlogs (POL) datasets (see Table 2 ). POL is available at http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/ mejn/ and all other datasets at http://snap.stanford.edu/data. We also used synthetic datasets, generated by the Albert-Barabasi model, as in [15] , with a varying number of edges in [500, 10000] . We refer to the dataset with 10000 edges as AB. We set p(u , u) = 1 |n − (u)| for each edge (u , u) as in [5, 15] . We also set the maximum probability threshold for a path to θ = 0.01, so that all methods achieve a good accuracy/efficiency trade-off by discarding paths that have low probability to influence a node, as in [6] . The default value for k was 5 and for c was 1. The vulnerable nodes were selected randomly. To improve the efficiency of ISS, we used the CELF optimization [10] for the submodular bound functions (steps 14 and 16). Also, the results for ISS were averaged over 10 runs. All experiments ran on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2640 @2.66GHz with 64GB RAM. Due to space limitations, we omit some results that were qualitatively similar to the reported ones (e.g., results for varying |V| in W I). Comparison to RB. GR constructs seed-sets that influence at least 5.5 and up to 38 times more non-vulnerable nodes than those constructed by RB, for different values of c (see Figs. 2a and 2b) and k (see Figs. 2c and 2d) . The reason is that, for all c and k values, vulnerable nodes were distributed across the graph. So, the seed-sets constructed by RB that did not influence vulnerable nodes did not influence many non-vulnerable nodes, while those constructed by GR influenced a small number of vulnerable nodes but could reach to and influence many more non-vulnerable nodes. Moreover, TIM, GR M B , and ISS outperformed RB (the results for them are omitted). Thus, in all subsequent experiments, we omit results for RB, since it does not construct practically useful solutions and set c = 1 because this allows constructing seed-sets with good σ N /σ V trade-off. ASR with c = 1. All our algorithms substantially outperform TIM in terms of ASR for varying k (see Figs. 3a, 3b, and 3c) and varying number of vulnerable nodes |V| (see Fig. 3d ). ISS outperformed all other methods, being 3, 1.7, and 2 times better than TIM, GR, and GR M B on average (over all datasets and k values), respectively. ISS was also 8.9, 3.3, and 1.9 times better than TIM, GR, and GR M B on average (over all |V| values in Fig. 3d ), respectively. We omit the results for GR and TIM for the largest dataset WI from all subsequent experiments, since GR and TIM did not finish within 3 days. (1 − σ V (S) |V| , σ N (S) |N | ), referred to as protection and utility of a seed-set S. ISS outperformed TIM with respect to both protection and utility, achieving overall better protection than GR and better utility than GR M B . We also report σ N and σ V in Figs. 4c to 5d. GR and TIM constructed seed-sets that influence too many vulnerable nodes. GR M B performed inconsistently (e.g., its seed-sets influenced few vulnerable nodes in Fig. 5b and too many vulnerable nodes in Fig. 5c ). ISS influenced few vulnerable nodes and a moderate number of non-vulnerable nodes, achieving a good σ N /σ V trade-off. Efficiency. All our methods are much faster than TIM for varying k (see Figs. 6a and 6b). TIM required 10 hours when k = 50 in the case of T W which only has 235 nodes, and 17 days when k = 25 in the case of P OL. GR was faster but did not terminate within 3 days in the case of W I, and GR M B was the fastest due to its efficient spread estimation function [24] . ISS was significantly faster than GR and TIM and the most scalable method with respect to k. Fig. 6c shows the runtime for varying |V|. All our algorithms become faster with |V|, since fewer nodes can be selected as seeds and are at least three orders of magnitude faster than TIM on average. Fig. 6d shows the runtime for varying number of edges. Our algorithms were faster than TIM by up to three orders of magnitude.
Related work
No existing work addresses influence maximization when there are vulnerable nodes. The most related works are [20] and [15] . [20] aims to maximize the difference between the expected number of influenced users who belong to a target group and the expected number of all other influenced users. Our work differs from [20] along three dimensions. First, [20] can select target nodes as seeds, but we cannot do the same for vulnerable nodes, as this would harm them. Second, our ASR measure has desired properties unlike the measure σ N (S) − σ V (S) in [20] (see Section 3). Third, our methods are substantially more effective and efficient than the heuristic in [20] . [15] is applied after influence maximization (i.e., considers a given seed-set) and seeks to delete edges in order to limit the activation probability of vulnerable nodes in the Linear Threshold model [10] . Thus, it is orthogonal to our work.
There are many works on targeted viral marketing (e.g., [11, 13, 20, 22, 25] ). For example, [13] considered influence maximization when each target node has a constant profit, and [22] considered the impact of the location and login time of target nodes. Unlike ours, the works in [11, 13, 20, 22, 25] do not consider vulnerable nodes.
There are also works on influence maximization considering nodes with negative impact on the influence diffusion process [2, 5] . [5] studied influence maximization under a model where each node can diffuse information of opposite content to the information that is being spread from the seed-set. [2] studied influence maximization, when some nodes reject the diffused information. Different from these works, no node negatively impacts the influence diffusion process in our approach.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study influence maximization when there are vulnerable nodes. We first propose a measure for limiting the influence to vulnerable nodes, which is obtained by applying additive smoothing to the ratio between the expected number of influenced non-vulnerable nodes and the expected number of influenced vulnerable nodes. Based on the measure, we define a new influence maximization problem that seeks to find a seed-set of size at most k that maximizes the measure. We propose two greedy baseline heuristics, and the ISS approximation algorithm to solve our influence maximization problem. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets and show that ISS outperforms the method of [20] and our baselines in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
